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marriage is nevertheless separate property.58 An action under a revised section
1558 would be a proper case in which to extend the rule requiring stronger evi-
dence. Thus, the good sense of the courts, in weighing evidence of the ward's
past conduct, will serve to close the door to the undeserving. 59
Paul N. Daigle*
58 Estate of Nickson, 187 Cal. 603, 203 Pac. 106 (1921).
59 Guardianship of Christiansen, 248 A.C.A. 477, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967), decided
as this issue went to press, is a leading case holding that the probate court could author-
ize gifts to children and grandchildren from the principal of the incompetent's estate if
certain conditions are met, notwithstanding Probate Code § 1558.
*Member, Second Year Class.
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS TO MAKE MUTUAL WILLS
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTIES
It has been said that the will and the contract are "the two great institutions
without which modem society can scarcely be supposed capable of holding to-
gether."1 At times, the legal significance of these two great institutions is taken
for granted and lost in a maze of rules. The formation of a contract to make a
will presents an excellent opportunity to delve beyond these rules. What appears
to be a collision of established principles compels one to consider certain factors
before determining which institution is to prevail.
The recent case of Mitchell v. Marklund2 involved an agreement to make
mutual wills.3 A husband and wife entered into the following property settlement
in connection with a divorce proceeding:
[B]oth parties desire that all of the property of which they die possessed go
equally to their two children . . . [I1n order to effect this disposition of their
property, the parties hereto agree to execute wills including such provisions and
that said wills when executed shall be irrevocable. 4
Following the divorce, the mother executed a will contrary to the terms of
the agreement. The father followed by executing a will naming his second wife
sole beneficiary. The father was the first to die and the children of his first mar-
riage brought an action to enforce the agreement and to impose a constructive
trust on the property held by his second wife through his will. The court held
that the father had no duty to perform his promise for two reasons, namely, that
either party was privileged to change his will while both parties were alive,5 and
that the mother's breach released the father from his obligations.6
I See McMurray, Liberty of Testation and Some Modem Limitations Thereon, 14
ILL. L. Bxv. 96 (1919), commenting on MAnm, AxcmNT LAW (Pollock ed. 1884).
2238 Cal. App. 2d 398, 47 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1965).
a "Mutual wills are the separate wills of two or more persons which are reciprocal
in their provisions. A joint and mutual will is one instrument executed jointly by two
or more persons, the provisions of which are reciprocal:" Daniels v. Bridges, 123 Cal.
App. 2d 585, 588-89, 267 P.2d 343, 345 (1954).
4 238 Cal. App. 2d at 400, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
5 Id. at 406, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
Old. at 402-03, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
January, 1967] NOTES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The reasoning of the Mitchell court indicates that this area of California law
needs to be examined. A contract to make a will attempts to dispose of property
while achieving ends unavailable through the use of other means of disposition.
Unlike the creation of an inter vivos trust or the conveyance of a future interest,
a contract to make a will attempts to dispose of property remaining at death.
Unlike the mere making of a will there is a binding effect due to the contract.
The circumstances of Mitchell-a separating couple with children-often accom-
pany agreements to make mutual wills. A plan which would assure support7 for
the children without causing the separating couple great inconvenience is sought.
Such a plan is found in a property settlement agreement incorporating promises
to make wills. Although property settlement agreements are generally recognized"
and favored9 by the courts, problems arise when they attempt to restrict the
privilege of testamentary disposition. Additional problems arise when third parties
are named as beneficiaries.
The purpose of this discussion is to determine the extent to which a property
settlement agreement to make mutual wills restricts either of the agreeing parties
from subsequently making different wills without liability for breach of contract.
The first question involved is whether an agreement to make mutual wills has
the normal effect of a contract comprised of a promise for a promise, such that
neither party may renounce his promise without the other's consent. The second
question involved is whether the naming of a third party beneficiary requires
something more than mutual consent to free the agreeing parties from any obli-
gation to make mutual wills. The third question involved is whether failure of
one party to make a will in accordance with this type of separation agreement
necessarily means that the other need not perform.
Contracts To Make Wills
A contract to make a will brings the social desirability of compelling per-
formance of a promise into conflict with the policy of allowing individuals to
freely dispose of their property at death.'0 It is well-settled that a contract to
make a will is valid and enforceable 1 both in law' 2 and in equity.18 California
cases have followed this pattern indicating that a contract with a single promise
7 Support for children is also provided for by law. See, CAL,. Crv. CoDE: § 196
(obligation of parents to support children); CAL. Civ. CoDE § 205 (charging estate of
deceased parent).
8 Cochrum v. Cochrum, 162 Cal. App. 2d 825, 831, 328 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1958).
9 Henley v. Henley, 183 Cal. App. 2d 519, 521-22, 6 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 (1960).
10 See generally, 6 PowELL, REAL PRoPEnIy f[ 963 (1965). "The principles which
apply to a contract to make a will apply to contracts not to revoke a will which the
promisor has made theretofore, to contracts to revoke a will which had been made
theretofore, and to die intestate, to contracts to refrain from making a will and to die
intestate, and to contracts not to take under a will which the adversary party has made
theretofore." 1 PAGE, WILLs § 10.1, at 436 (Bowe & Parker 1960) [Hereinafter cited as
PACE].
1 PAGE § 10.1, at 432. Wolf v. Donahue, 206 Cal. 213, 220, 273 Pac. 547, 550
(1929).12 Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580, 584, 147 Pac. 259, 263 (1915).
13 Bank of California v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 516, 524, 106 P.2d 879, 884
(1940).
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to make a will merits no special treatment.1 4 However, treatment of contracts
comprised of promises to make mutual wills seems to deviate from the normal
rules of contract law.15 It is sometimes said that if all the parties to such an
agreement are living, any party may repudiate his promise and make a different
will without liability for breach of contract.' 6 The Mitchell court appears to be
first in California to incorporate this proposition in a decision.
Numerous California cases have held that the surviving party to a contract
to make mutual wills is estopped from renouncing his promise after one party
dies leaving a will in accordance with the agreement.'1 It is unclear why the
doctrine of estoppel, rather than normal principles of contract law, is used to
enforce such an agreement. An analysis of California cases leads to the conclusion
that this concept may have developed by error.
The first case presented to the California Supreme Court involving a contract
with a single promise to give property at death was Owens v. McNally.'8 The
court recognized the existence of a contractual obligation and said, "[H]e who
makes a contract on this subject is as much bound thereby as he would be by
any agreement on any other subject."19 McCabe v. Healy,2 0 unequivocally follow-
ing the principles set forth in the Owens case, was the first to grant what is now
14 See, e.g., Davis v. Jacoby, 1 Cal. 2d 370, 34 P.2d 1026 (1934) (bilateral con-
tract with a promise to perform services exchanged for a promise to give property at
death).
15 Deviation from normal principles refers to an exception made to the principle
that a promise made in exchange for another promise is consideration to support the
formation of a bilateral contract. Hereafter, the discussion of "special treatment" is
limited to mean this deviation from normal contract law.
16 "[W]hile both or all of the parties to such an agreement are yet alive, any party
may recede therefrom, and revoke his will or make a different disposition... on giving
proper notice . . .or where such other or others have actual knowledge . . .provided
such other is afforded an ample opportunity to make a new will, and has not changed
his position, to his detriment, in reliance on the agreement." 97 C.J.S. Wills § 1367, at
306-07 (1957). For a thorough analysis of this proposition as applied in other juris-
dictions, see Sparks, Legal Effect of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath Prior to the Death
of the Promisor, 53 MicEr. L. REv. 215, 222-31 (1954). Professor Sparks suggests that
"the courts give effect to the contract and then offer the completely irrelevant dictum
that either party could have revoked while both were living but that neither can do so
after one has died." He goes- on to say that "only a few cases involving an attempted
rescission by the first to die have come before the courts, but those few have almost
invariably reached the conclusion that there was never a right of unilateral rescission
from the moment the contract was entered into. Cases which appear to reach the oppo-
site result have usually been decided on other grounds." Id. at 230-31. See, e.g., Ander-
son v. Benson, 117 F. Supp. 765 (D. Neb.), appeal dismissed, 215 F.2d 752 (8th Cir.
1954); Trindle v. Zimmerman, 115 Colo. 323, 172 P.2d 676 (1946); Stewart v. Todd,
190 Iowa 283, 173 N.W. 619 (1919); St. Denis v. Johnson, 143 Kan. 955, 57 P.2d 70
(1936).
17 E.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878 (1949).
38 113 Cal. 444, 45 Paa. 710 (1896) (services given in exchange for a promise to
make a will).
19 Id. at 448, 45 Pac. at 711, quoting Rivers v. Rivers, 4 Am. Dec. 609, 611 (S.C.
1811).
29 138 Cal. 81, 70 Pac. 1008 (1902).
known as "quasi-specific performance" 21 of a contract to make a will. With enforce-
ability of a contract with a single promise to make a will firmly established,
Estate of Rolls22 made clear the distinction between treatment of a will and of
a contract to make a will. The supreme court pointed out that an enforceable
contract has no effect on the probate of a will, and the probate of a will has no
effect on the enforcement of a valid contract.23 It should be noted that none of
the above cases deviate from the general principles of contract law, but on the
contrary, indicate that a contract to make a will should not merit any special
treatment.
Following these cases, Rolls v. Allen 24 presented an action in equity against
one who had revoked a mutual will. Here two parties had made mutual wills
without an accompanying agreement. One had died with his mutual will un-
changed, but before his will was probated, the survivor died leaving a different
will. The action was for equitable relief due to the latter's revocation of his mutual
will. Section 1279 of the California Civil Code25 provided, "A conjoint or mutual
will is valid, but may be revoked by any of the testators in like manner as any
other will" The court pointed out that this statute did not give special character
to a mutual will but merely provided that such a will is revocable like any other
will26 Contention was made that the mere making of mutual wills implied prom-
ises not to revoke. The court rejected this argument, saying that such a holding
would clearly be in violation of legislative intent since it would mean that all
mutual wills would in effect be irrevocable.2r Since there was no accompanying
agreement, the court held against the plaintiffs but said that had the survivor
retained and enjoyed benefits from the first dying party, he might well have
been estopped from exercising his right to revoke.28
In Notten v. Mensing,29 the supreme court was presented with a case involving
mutual wills made pursuant to an oral agreement. The statute of frauds provides
that an agreement to make a will is unenforceable without some note or mem-
21 
"An action of [this type] ... has been called one for quasi-specific performance
of the contract to make a will .... Since the making of a will cannot be compelled,
there can be no specific performance of such a contract in the strict sense, but under
certain circumstances equity will give relief equivalent to specific performance by im-
pressing a constructive trust .... " Ludwicki v. Guerin, 57 Cal. 2d 127, 130, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 823, 825, 367 P.2d 415, 417 (1961).
22 193 Cal. 594, 226 Pac. 608 (1924) (probate court lacks jurisdiction to relieve
against will not conforming to contract). For a discussion of well-recognized exceptions
to this rule where controversies have sufficient connection with a pending probate pro-
ceeding see Estate of Baglione, 65 A.C. 189, 53 Cal. Rptr. 139, 417 P.2d 683 (1966).
23 193 Cal. at 601, 226 Pac. at 610.
24204 Cal. 604, 269 Pac. 450 (1928) (parties are the same ones involved in Estate
of Rolls, 193 Cal. 594, 226 Pac. 608 (1924), now seeking relief in equity).
25 CAL. CrV. CODE § 1279 (Deering 1925), now CAL. PNo. CoDE § 23, without
substantial change.
26 204 Cal. at 607-08, 269 Pac. at 452.
27 Id. at 608, 269 Pac. at 452.
28 Id. at 609, 269 Pac. at 452. This dictum has not been applied in California. See,
Note, Mutual Wills, 48 CAI". L, Rxv. 858 (1960). 'In the absence of contract either
testator may revoke his will at anytime without liability, even if he has taken under
the will of his co-testator." Id. at 862.
29 3 Cal. 2d 469, 45 P.2d 198 (1935).
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orandum in writing.30 Here, the surviving party had revoked his will after taking
benefits through the mutual will left by the first dying party. The court held that
the survivor was estopped from pleading the statute of frauds as a defense, since
he had benefitted from the oral agreement to make mutual wills.
These two cases introduced the doctrine of estoppel as a remedial device
against revocation by surviving parties to mutual wills. It should be noted that
the doctrine was introduced in the absence of an accompanying agreement and
in the absence of evidence in writing. From these cases alone, there is no logical
reason to conclude that enforcement of a valid, written contract to make a will,
-whether mutual or otherwise, should not be based on normal principles of con-
tract law. In the absence of an enforceable contract, estoppel may lie against
one who took and enjoyed benefits from the first-dying party.
If a case immediately following Notten had involved one who repudiated his
written agreement to make mutual wills while both parties were alive, it may
fairly be surmised that the court would have enforced the agreement under nor-
mal principles of contract law. However, the first case with a written agreement
to make mutual wills was Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen,31 which involved an action
against a surviving party. The court held that the survivor could not revoke his
mutual will without liability. Instead of basing this decision on a bilateral con-
tractual obligation, the court said, "[H]e thereupon became estopped from making
any other or different disposition... "32 What appears to have been a failure
to recognize the circumstances under which the doctrine of estoppel had been
applied, gave rise to the implication that an agreement to make mutual wills in
California is unenforceable without estoppel. Since Sonnicksen, dicta has appeared
indicating that either party to an agreement to make mutual wills is privileged
to revoke his will prior to the other's death.33
Although Mitchell v. Marklund"4 used this proposition as a reason for its
decision, the court also based the decision on another factor.3 5 Thus, in spite of
Mitchell, it is still questionable that the proposition that either party to an agree-
ment to make mutual wills is free to renounce his promise while all parties are
alive is a correct statement of California law. Since it has been said that this is
the "general rule,"36 let us turn to the question of whether this position should
be adopted by the California courts.
80 CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1624 (6).
3145 Cal. App. 2d 46, 113 P.2d 495 (1941). Prior to this case, the supreme court
had been presented with a case involving a valid agreement to make mutual wills. How-
ever, in that case, the agreement to make mutual wills had been fully performed and
the problem of inheritance taxes was involved. It should be noted that for the purpose
of taxes, the estate involved was said to be "subject to the charge of the valid contract,"
and no mention of estoppel was made. Estate of Rath, 10 Cal. 2d 399, 404, 75 P.2d 509,
511 (1937).
32 45 Cal. App. 2d at 55, 113 P.2d at 500.
38 E.g., Alocco v. Fouche, 190 Cal. App. 2d 244, 250, 11 Cal. Rptr. 818, 822
(1961). For cases carrying on the estoppel theory see Lich v. Carlin, 184 Cal. App. 2d
128, 137, 7 Cal. Rptr. 555, 561 (1960); Van Houten v. Whitaker, 169 Cal. App. 2d
510, 514, 337 P.2d 900, 903 (1959); James v. Pawsey, 162 Cal. App. 2d 740, 747, 328
P.2d 1023, 1028 (1958).
34238 Cal. App. 2d 398, 47 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1965).
85 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
86 Allen v. Dillard, 15 Wash. 2d 35, 52, 129 P.2d 813, 820 (1942).
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This "rule" has been justified on the grounds that it is generally desirable to
continue one's power to alter the testamentary disposition of his property until
his death. 7 It seems that proponents of special treatment for a contract to make
a will lose sight of the fact that the privilege of testamentary disposition is merely
one of many property interests recognized by law and looked upon favorably
by society. The law has provided a means by which one may dispose of property
at his death. However, it also recognizes and respects ones right to freely dispose
of his property during his lifetime. Both interests are qualified by laws which
protect the interests of others.38 Little objection, if any, is raised against the sub-
jection of inter vivos property transfers to contractual obligations. Yet it is sug-
gested that the privilege to dispose of property at death may be too valuable to
allow its subjection to a contractual obligation. This suggestion implies that
although freedom to utilize one's property during his lifetime is precious, the free-
dom to dispose of it at death may be more precious. If it is urged that special
attention be directed toward a promise to devise and bequeath, then why shouldn't
similar attention be directed toward promises affecting other property interests?
In fact, it would seem that if any special privileges such as immunity from a
contractual obligation are to be granted, they should be directed toward promises
affecting one's property during his lifetime rather than at his death.39
One may conclude that the privilege of testamentary disposition and other
property interests are equally valuable. However, enforceability of a contract to
make a will may be questionable despite this conclusion. Still remaining, is the
fact that a will is essentially ambulatory and revocable.40 It may be argued that
37 Id. at 52-53, 129 P.2d at 821 citing Hirsh, Contracts to Devise and Bequeath,
9 Wis. L. Ev. 267, 275 (1933).
38 See generally, Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil
Rights, 15 HAsrTrNs L.J. 135 (1963).
39 See McMurray, Liberty of Testation and Some Modem Limitations Thereon, 14
ILL. L. REv. 96 (1919). "'What is a testament... It is the expression of the will of a
man who has no longer any will, respecting property which is no longer his property;
it is the action of a man no longer accountable for his actions to mankind, it is an
absurdity, and an absurdity ought not have the force of law." Id. at 97 quoting Mira-
beau, Discours sur legalite de partages (1791). See also, 6 PowErL, REAL PRoPERTY
F 940 (1965). "Persons untrammeled in the formulation of philosophical viewpoints by
a knowledge of history, have insisted that 'the practice of allowing the owner of prop-
erty to direct its destination after his death. . . is boeval with civilization itself....'"
This simply, is not true." Id. at 373. Compare, Costigan, Constructive Trusts Based on
Promises Made to Secure Bequests, Devises, or Intestate Succession, 28 HAnv. L. REv.
237 (1914). "The species of contract to bequeath or to devise which results in a joint
will, or in a joint and mutual will, or in mutual wills calls for special reference." Id. at
346-47.4 0 
"Wills are ambulatory by their nature and create no rights which the court can
recognize or enforce until they become operative by the death of the testator. 'Acts
which remain thus inchoate . . . are in the nature of unexecuted intentions. The author
of them may change his mind, or the state may determine that it is inexpedient to allow
them to take effect."' Estate of Berger, 198 Cal. 103, 106, 243 Pac. 862, 863 (1926).
"The word ambulatory is sometimes used to describe the idea of revocability, but it is
also frequently used to mean that a will operates upon the facts and situation existing
at the time of the testator's death, and may pass property acquired after the will was
executed as well as property owned at the time of execution." 1 PA E § 1.2, at 4.
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enforceability of a contract to make a will violates this essential characteristic of
a will.41
Why should contract principles be allowed to destroy the privilege to change
a will when a will, by its very nature, is revocable and ambulatory? The law is
not ignorant of the fact that circumstances and a man's thinking are subject to
ehange.42 Contract law is not directed against the freedom to change one's mind.
It results from a balance between this freedom and the interests of others which
merit protection.43 Not all promises are enforceable, but merely those that are
supported by "consideration" or those which have caused a detrimental change
of position.44 Promises in a contract represent future actions which are "revocable
and ambulatory in nature" without a contract, otherwise the contract would serve
no purpose. So to argue that the privilege of testamentary disposition should not
be subject to the normal rules of contract because it is revocable and ambulatory
in nature is to beg the question.
Revocability of a will is too often taken for granted. Loose thinking may lead
to a conclusion that a will is not only revocable in nature, but is also made
revocable by law. A will, as recognized in its Anglo-American form, takes no
effect until its maker dies. Since the privilege of testamentary disposition is looked
upon as a state-created right rather than as a natural right, there is little doubt
that the state could establish the first making of a will as final without being
subject to change.45 Fortunately, no effect has been given to such an unjustifiable
position, thus a will remains revocable until death of its maker. This, however,
does not mean that a will is made revocable by law. It simply means that the
law does not make a will irrevocable once it is made. Comparison of a will with
a deed illustrates this point. Both instruments represent the abstract process of
transferring property. The deed takes effect upon delivery, 46 while the will takes
effect upon the death of its maker. Both are revocable and alterable prior to
these occurrences. It is seldom suggested that the law makes a deed revocable.
41 fBut . Meislin, Revocation of Contracts to Bequeath Benefitting Third Parties,
44 VA. L. REv. 41 (1958). "Lending encouragement to the smudging of finely drawn
judicial lines are those texts which oppose differentiation between contracts to bequeath
and other agreements. Such a viewpoint fails to take heed of the ambulatory element
necessarily present in any plan which substitutes for a will." Id. at 59-60.42"Many of us indeed would shudder at the idea of being bound by every promise,
no matter how foolish, without any chance of letting increased wisdom undo past fool-
ishness. Certainly, some freedom to change one's mind is necessary for free intercourse
between those who lack omniscience." Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HAnv. L. REV.
553, 573 (1932).
43 1 CoRnnN, CoNTRAaCrs § 1 (1963).
44 See, RESTATEMrENT (SEcoND), CoNTRAcTs §§ 75-90 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
45 "'[T]he right to make testamentary disposition of property is not an inherent
right or a right of citizenship, nor is it even a right granted by the constitution. It rests
wholly upon the legislative will, and is derived entirely from statutes.' . .. The Legis-
lature may withhold the right altogether, or impose any conditions or limitations upon
it which it chooses." Estate of Burnison, 33 Cal. 2d 638, 639-40, 204 P.2d 330, 331
(1949), aff'd sub nor. United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87 (1950).
46 
"Delivery is the force that vitalizes the instrument. Here there was no life in the
instrument, because there was no delivery." Gould v. Wise, 97 Cal. 532, 535, 32 Pac.
576, 577 (1893).
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Yet an essential 'characteristic of a deed is that it is revocable until there is a
delivery. Similarly, an essential characteristic of a will is that it is revocable until
the maker dies. Our laws, however, give more emphasis to formalities for revo-
cation of a will. The reason for this emphasis is not that revocability is a more
essential characteristic of a will. Death, unlike delivery, is certain to occur. Laws
stress the requirements of positive action necessary to give effect to a deed, since
without positive action, an executed deed will never take effect. On the other
hand, laws stress requirements of positive action necessary to revoke a will, since
without positive action, an executed will inevitably will take effect. For these
reasons, the suggestion that a will is made revocable by law, should be confined
to the basis of its origin, namely to emphasize that a will is inoperative until death
of its maker.47 This suggestion offers no support against enforcement of a con-
tract to make wills according to normal principles of contract law.
California courts have enforced contracts with single promises to make a will
according to normal principles of contract law.48 Only when an executory bilateral
contract embodies promises to make wills on both sides of the agreement does
enforcement become questionable. Arguments made against normal enforcement
of an agreement to make mutual wills, are the same arguments which may be
used against enforcement of any agreement with a promise to make a will. Until
justification can be found for distinguishing between an agreement with only one
promise to make a will and an agreement to make mutual wills, the principles of
contract law applied to the former should apply to the latter. Also, without reason
for giving the privilege of testamentary disposition greater immunity against con-
tractual obligations than is given to other property interests, an agreement to
make mutual wills should constitute an enforceable bilateral contract.49
Third Party Beneficiaries
Many agreements to make mutual wills involve third party beneficiaries. The
addition of a third party beneficiary should not make an unenforceable agreement
suddenly enforceable, since the beneficiary's rights are dependent on the existence
of a contract.8 0 If either party to a contract to make mutual wills is allowed to
repudiate his promise while both parties are alive, it should follow that the naming
of a third party beneficiary does not extinguish this privilege. Assuming that an
enforceable third party beneficiary contract does exist,51 the question arises
47 "The essential element of revocability follows from the idea that the will is not
meant to create any rights in others or to pass any interest in the property covered by
the will prior to the maker's death." 1 PAGE § 1.2, at 3-4.
48 E.g., Davis v. Jacoby, 1 Cal. 2d 370, 34 P.2d 1026 (1934).
49 "Our law has no separate concept of 'will made in pursuance of contract;' we
must treat the will part as a will and the contract part as a contract." ATEtNsoN, WHrA.s
224 (2d ed. 1953).
50 "The claim of a beneficiary is dependent upon the validity of the contract that
creates it. If that contract is void, voidable, or unenforceable, his claim is likewise
affected. Thus an informal pr6mise without consideration cannot be enforced by a
beneficiary ...." 4 Coninr, CONTRACTS § 818, at 266-67 (1951).
51 
"The right to enforce such a contract to make a particular disposition of prop-
erty on death is not restricted to the promisee. Where two parties agree to make mutual
wills... to certain third persons . . . the intended devisees and legatees are entitled to
enforce their rights as beneficiaries under the agreement." Brown v. Superior Court, 34
Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949).
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whether the contracting parties may mutually rescind the contract and make
different wills.
In Riley v. Riley,52 a case involving an action by third party beneficiaries to
enforce a settlement agreement, the court said: "The parties to a contract entered
into for the benefit of third persons may rescind or abrogate it without the assent
of such third persons at any time before the contract is accepted, adopted or acted
upon by such third persons."5 3 Subsequently, James v. Pawsey54 involved a three-
party agreement to make mutual wills which would ultimately favor an infant
beneficiary. The court distinguished this agreement from the normal agreement
to make mutual wills since there was consideration other than promises to make
wills, and concluded that rights and obligations were created when the agreement
was executed.55 In answer to a contention that the contract was mutually re-
scinded, the court said, "Acceptance by a third party donee beneficiary so as to
preclude rescission without the consent of the beneficiary... will be presumed,
where the beneficiary... is an infant at the time of the making of the contract. "56
As previously discussed, the proposition that either party may unilaterally
repudiate an agreement to make mutual wills while both parties are alive is
unsound. However, it may be equally unsound to deny the parties the power of
mutually consenting to a rescission which would allow them to make different
wills. Denial of the power to mutually rescind may result from application of
contract principles involving the question of when a third party beneficiary's
rights are "vested."5 7 Since all contracts to make wills in favor of third persons
involve this problem, it is necessary to examine this phase of contract law.
Third party beneficiary rights have developed from a stage of non-recognition
to practically uniform recognition in the United States.58 The leading American
52118 Cal. App. 2d 11, 256 P.2d 1056 (1953).
53 Id. at 15, 256 P.2d at 1058. The action in this case was to enforce an agreement
to make mutual wills. Promises were made to bequeath interests, which the contracting
parties had in trust, in accordance with a separate trust agreement. The court avoided
the issue of whether the first to die was privileged to make another will by holding that
his promise was not broken because the trust had been validly revoked thus leaving no
interest to give in accordance with the agreement. The phrase quoted in text was made
with reference to rescission of the trust agreement that accompanied the settlement
agreement.
54 162 Cal. App. 2d 740, 328 P.2d 1023 (1958).
55 Id. at 748, 328 P.2d at 1028.
58 Id. at 747, 328 P.2d at 1028. In this case, rescission was attempted after one of
the three parties had already died leaving a will in accordance with the agreement.
Thus, there were stronger reasons given by the court to support the decision. However,
a contention was made that the first to die had only subjected mere expectancies to the
agreement. Although the court held against this contention, the theory of presumption
of acceptance by a minor beneficiary was suggested as a reason for denying a privilege
to rescind in the absence of grounds for estoppel. It seems that with one party already
dead, there could be no rescission anyway, and that the suggestion by the court is mere
dicta. However, the case is used here to illustrate some of the confusion that may arise
when third party beneficiary problems are combined with problems of agreements to
make mutual wills.
57 The term "vested" as used in this discussion means fixed in the contract terms
which are unalterable without the beneficiary's consent.
58 See generally 4 Connm, CoNrncrs § 772 (1951).
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case, Lawrence v. Fox,59 held that a third party beneficiary was entitled to an
action for breach of a contract made in his favor. This case was the forerunner of
judicial development of rights in one who was not a party to the contract. Since
then, the courts have struggled with the determination of the extent of these
rights. It became necessary to harmonize the third party beneficiary contract
with orthodox contract law which dealt with a promisee and a promisor. The ulti-
mate question was whether the beneficiary's consent was necessary for subsequent
alteration or rescission of the contract. An illustration of a controversial 60 answer
to this question is the position taken by the Restatemen of Contracts. Section 142
provides:
Unless the power to do so is reserved, the duty of the promisor to the donee
beneficiary0l cannot be released by the promisee or affected by any agreement
between the promise and the promisor ....
Section 143 provides:
A discharge of the promisor by the promisee ... is effective against a creditor
beneficiary62 if... the creditor beneficiary does not bring suit upon the promise
or otherwise materially change his position in reliance thereon ....
The Restatements position is clear. With respect to the donee beneficiary,
his rights are fixed in the terms of the contract once it is made. With respect to the
creditor beneficiary, his rights are subject to alteration by the original parties
until he brings an action on the contract or changes position in reliance. The
situation in California, however, is not so clear.
In California, third party beneficiary rights are based on section 1559 of the
California Civil Code which provides, "A contract, made expressly for the benefit
of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto
rescind it."
Before going further, the significance of this statute should be noted. It was
enacted only thirteen years after Lawrence v. Fox63 was decided. Although the
Lawrence court did not speak of a "creditor beneficiary," the case involved a
promise to pay a debt of the promisee.64 Subsequently, New York Courts refused
to extend third party rights beyond the facts of the Lawrence case.65 Eventually,
donee beneficiary rights developed and there now exists in American jurispru-
dence, the classification of beneficiaries into donees and creditors. The California
statute, however, makes no mention of such a classification. It seems to give any
person for whose benefit the contract is expressly made, whether donee or creditor,
59 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
60 For a sharp criticism of the Restatements position see Page, The Power of the
Contracting Parties to Alter a Contract for Rendering Performance to a Third Person,
12 Wis. L. Rxv. 141 (1937).
61 "[One] is a donee beneficiary if it appears... that the purpose of the promisee
in obtaining the promise . . . is to make a gift to the beneficiary ... ." sTATEmNT,
CoN-Acrs § 133 (1932).6 2 
"IOne] is a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears ... and
performance of the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the
promisee to the beneficiary ... ." REsTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 133 (1932).
63 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
64 Id. at 269.
65 See, e.g., Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280, 284-85, 25 Am. Rep. 195, 198 (1877).
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a right to enforce the contract.66 It also qualifies the beneficiary's rights with the
clause, "before the parties thereto rescind." Simply stated, before the courts were
ever faced with determining whether a donee beneficiary should be entitled to
enforce the contract made in his favor, or whether the contracting parties could
rescind without the beneficiary's consent, section 1559 of the Civil Code had
become a part of California law. Perhaps it may be said that section 1559 is as
much a forerunner of third party beneficiary rights in California as is Lawrence v.
Fox in the United States.
Although the California courts have described beneficiaries as donees and
creditors, 61 there is no indication of different principles for each with respect to
the time when the rights of the beneficiary are vested. There are three positions
available with respect to the time when these rights are vested-when there is a
change of position or institution of suit, 8 when the contract is made,69 at some
time in between.70
Few would attempt to justify the power to rescind after the beneficiary has
changed his position or brought suit. However, holding the contract unalterable
without the beneficiary's consent before these stages is questionable. California
decisions dealing with this point have reached various conclusions. One outdated
case concluded that the making of a third party beneficiary contract is an offer and
once it is accepted, the parties may not rescind.71 Other cases have said that the
66 See, Robinson's Women's Apparel v. Union Bank, 67 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y.
1946) (applying California law). For a good coverage of third party beneficiary rights
in California see Langmaid, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons in California, 27
CAI". L. REv. 497 (1939).
67 Southern Cal. Gas. Co. v. ABC Constr. Co., 204 Cal. App. 2d 747, 751-52, 22
Cal. Rptr. 540, 543-44 (1962).
O8 Logically, the power of the contracting parties to rescind should not go beyond
this point. To allow rescission after institution of suit would in effect, practically nullify
any right in the beneficiary to enforce the contract. No cases can be found allowing
mutual rescission after the beneficiary has initiated a suit. Also, it seems unnecessary to
apply estoppel to prevent rescission since estoppel is a doctrine that stands independent
from the existence of an enforceable contract. "A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by the enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may
be limited as justice requires." RESTATE M=EN (SEcoND), CoNTRnAcTs § 90 (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1965).
(9 An example is the Restatements position with regard to donee beneficiaries. See
text accompanying note 61 supra.
70 There are cases holding that the beneficiary's rights vest when "he learns of"
the contract, to when he "expresses assent thereto." SnmssoN, CoNTRa&crs § 122, at 256
(2d ed. 1965).71 Central Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 18 Cal. App. 2d 559, 64
P.2d 465 (1937), hearing den., 18 Cal. App. 2d 567, 65 P.2d 1301 (1937). The denial
was based on the finding that there was no rescission and the statements made by the
lower court, with regard to "acceptance" preventing rescission, were disapproved. See
More v. Hutchinson, 187 Cal. 623, 203 Pac. 97 (1921) (involving the statute of limita-
tions) for a case applying the theory that the third party beneficiary contract is an offer
which may be accepted by the beneficiary. In Bogart v. George K. Porter Co., 193 Cal.
197, 223 Pac. 959 (1924) the court rejected the More theory but saved the case by
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parties may rescind at anytime prior to institution of suit as long as no estoppel is
present.'T Still others have expressed what is said to be the general rule,73 that
the contracting parties may rescind until the contract is accepted, adopted, or
acted upon.7 4 As previously mentioned, the Pawsey case suggests a presumption
of acceptance when the beneficiary is a minor, thus making the contract unalter-
able once it is made.
The offer-acceptance theory has been amply criticized elsewhere as one which
ultimately leads to confusion. 75 It has been rejected in California,7 yet the idea
of "acceptance" has found its way via the "general rule that the contract may not
be rescinded once accepted, adopted or acted upon."77 It should be noted that
this position is one which has developed in other jurisdictions.78 It seems unwise
to adopt it merely because it is the general rule if it is otherwise unjustifiable.
As previously mentioned, third party beneficiary rights in California are based on a
statute enacted early in 1872. Courts in other jurisdictions have had to struggle
to establish rights in one who is not a party to the contract. As said by one court,
while referring to this judicial process:
It is useless to endeavor to review the authorities touching the subject with
a view of harmonizing them upon any one single theory as to the principle upon
which the liability to a third person is based, or as to what are the essential ele-
ments to effect it. There is as much confusion, probably, in the judicial holdings
in respect to the matter, as on any question of law that can be mentioned....
There is confusion not only between different courts but confusion in the de-
cisions in many jurisdictions in the same court.79
The position that the contract is fixed once made seems clearly untenable in
California.80 This result has been suggested by way of a presumption of acceptance
distinguishing and then saying that even if the More theory was applied, the offer had
lapsed because of an unreasonable time. Id. at 211, 223 Pac. at 965.72 E.g., Silveyra v. Harper, 82 Cal. App. 2d 761, 766, 187 P.2d 83, 86 (1947);
R. J. Cardinal Co. v. Ritchie, 218 Cal. App. 2d 124, 136, 32 Cal. Rptr. 545, 552 (1963).
7 3 
"After the third person accepts, adopts, or acts upon the contract entered into
for his benefit, the parties thereto cannot rescind or modify it without his consent so as
to affect or deprive him of his rights thereunder, in the absence of a reservation of the
right of rescission or modification in the contract. This rule applies to an agreement to
pay another's debts as well as to other third party beneficiary contracts. The rule is held
to be predicated, however, upon the third person having knowledge of the terms and
conditions of the agreement and not merely knowledge of its existence, and such knowl-
edge must be established by the third person claiming the benefit of such agreement."
17 Am. Jun. 2d Contracts § 318, at 747 (1964). See also 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 390,
at 469 (1963).
74 E.g., Riley v. Riley, 118 Cal. App. 2d 11, 15, 256 P.2d 1056, 1058 (1953); James
v. Pawsey, 162 Cal. App. 2d 740, 747, 328 P.2d 1023, 1028 (1958).
75See 4 ConBiN, CoNTRAcTs § 813, at 245 (1951); Langmaid, supra note 66, at
503; 12 CALIF. L. REv. 328 (1924).
76 See notes 71, 75 supra.
77 Note 74 supra.
78 This position was introduced in California in Riley v. Riley, 118 Cal. App. 2d
11, 15, 256 P.2d 1056, 1058 (1953) citing 12 Am. Jun. Contracts § 290, at 843 (1938).
Cases used to support the statement in Am. Jut. include none from California.
79 Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 522-23, 93 N.W. 440, 442 (1903).80 No cases except James v. Pawsey, 162 Cal. App. 2d 740, 328 P.2d 1023 (1958)
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in the ease of minor beneficiaries. 8 ' It may yet be attained by other presumptions
of acceptance.8
2
The rule that the contracting parties may rescind anytime before institution
of suit as long as no estoppel is present seems fair when applied to creditor
beneficiaries.8 3 If the same rule is to apply to donees and creditors, as appears to
be the case in California, there seems little justification for depriving the contrac-
ing parties of the power to mutually rescind before the beneficiary changes posi-
tion or brings a suit. When, for example, a contract to make mutual wills is made,
it may be unjust to deny the parties the power to mutually rescind their agree-
ment without consent of the beneficiary merely because he "accepts" the con-
tract.84 The creditor beneficiary suffers no loss if the contract is rescinded since
he still has the original obligation to rely upon. The donee beneficiary "has given
no consideration in the past, gives none in the present, and promises nothing in
the future."8 5 As provided in section 1559 of the California Civil Code, such a
hgve ever suggested that the contracting parties are without the power to rescind once
the contract is made. This position would seem to be in direct conflict with the clause
providing for rescission in section 1559 of the California Civil Code. This position,
which is taken by the Restatement of Contracts finds its support in insurance cases which
have held that beneficiaries of life insurance policies may not be changed without the
beneficiary's consent unless the power to do so is reserved in the terms of the contract.
See generally 4 CormN, CoNThACTs § 814, at 247 (1951). But see Vance, The Bene-
Jlciary's Interest in a Life Insurance Policy, 31 YAix L.J. 343, 360 (1922), where Pro-
fessor Vance concludes that "[T]he doctrine of vested rights in the beneficiary, having
its origin in statutes intended primarily to safeguard the interests of married women and
children in the proceeds of insurance... when expanded to cover all cases of insurance
for the benefit of a third party, has proved unsuited to the needs of the community and
destructive of the actual intention of most persons procuring insurance, and that by dint
of express stipulation in policies, and very slow judicial retreat, we shall return to the
view that seems both just and reasonable, that, with the exception of such special in-
terests as may be secured to married women and children by statute, no rights should
be held to accrue to a sole beneficiary until the policy has matured." Query, if the rule
should not be extended to other phases of insurance, why should it be extended beyond
insurance cases at all? Support for the Restatement's position is also found by theoreti-
cally looking at the donee beneficiary contract as an irrevocable gift to the donee. 2
WnLusToN, CoTRncrrs § 396, at 1067 (3d ed. 1957); 4 Couniu, Cornmacrs § 814, at
254 (1951).81 See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
82 "Such a new right cannot possibly be detrimental.... [1It is quite possible here
to indulge the presumption of assent to such a donation without any knowledge or ex-
pression of assent on the part of the creditor" 4 ConnN, CoNnAcrs § 815, at 259
(1951) (criticizing the "acceptance" rule when applied to creditor beneficiaries).
83*It seems better to construct a rule on the basis of estoppel unless the trans-
action ought to be regarded as an irrevocable gift to the third party from the begin-
ning." 4 ConBn, CoN-aRcrs § 815, at 259 (1951).
84It is difficult to predict what will constitute "acceptance" if California courts
adopt the "general rule." The only cases found that have suggested denial of the power
to rescind before institution of suit or estoppel are James v. Pawsey, 162 Cal. App. 2d
740, 328 P.2d 1023 (1958) and Central Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.,
18 Cal. App. 2d 559, 64 P.2d 465 (1937). For a collection of cases from other juris-
dictions see 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 390, at 469 (1963).85Page, The Power of the Contracting Parties to Alter a Contract for Rendering
Performance to a Third Person, 12 Wis. L. BEv. 141, 184 (1936).
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contract may be enforced by the beneficiary at anytime "before the parties thereto
rescind it." Thus, an agreement to make mutual wills should be subject to altera-
tion by mutual consent of the agreeing parties before the beneficiary changes
position or initiates a suit.8 6
The Mitchell court was not concerned with mutual rescission since the decision
was based on reasons which made the finding of a mutual rescission irrelevant.
Discussions in the previous and following sections, attempt to show that the
reasons given by the court may be unsound. Perhaps, the matter of mutual
rescission should have been litigated.87
Conditional Performance
It is not unusual for a couple to include conditions in their agreement to make
wills. For example, promises might be made to devise and bequeath to the chil-
dren if the parent dies before the child reaches a certain age. A promise of this
nature is made expressly conditional and the parent, of course, has no duty to
perform if the condition is not met.88 However, the absence of an express condi-
tion does not necessarily mean that the promise is unconditional, for the law is
apt to imply other conditions upon which performance is dependent. As will be
shown, a separation agreement to make mutual wills may sometimes present an
unusual situation in which a constructive condition, normally applied in bilateral
contracts, should not be applied.
At one time, promises were independently performable.89 That is, performance
by one party was not dependent on performance by the other. Today, courts are
inclined to find constructive dependence of promises in a bilateral contract when-
ever possible. 90 In a normal settlement agreement to make mutual wills, each
spouse promises that he will leave property to the survivor, who in turn will leave
property to the children. If the first dying party fails to carry out his promise, the
86 The contract doctrine of anticipatory repudiation is applicable to contracts to
make wills. See, Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567, 593, 2 Cal. Rptr. 609, 620, 349
P.2d 289, 300 (1960). For example, "It has also been recognized that the promisees of
such a contract need not wait until the death of the promisor but may seek equitable
relief against inter vivos conveyances made by him in fraud of their rights." Brown v.
Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949). See generally Sparks,
Legal Effect of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath Prior to the Death of the Promisor: I,
53 MIC H. L. RMv. 1 (1954). Since most agreements to make wills are in writing, alter-
ations other than a complete rescission may encounter an additional problem. For ex-
ample CAL. Crv. CoDy § 1698 provides, "A contract in writing may be altered by a
contract in writing, or by an executed oral agreement, and not otherwise." See also
D. L. Godbey & Sons Constr. Co. v. Deane, 39 Cal. 2d 429, 246 P.2d 946 (1952).
8 7 Compare Page, supra note 85, at 164. "If the contract between A and B is
executory on both sides, and B has failed to perform the contract to such a degree that
A could treat the contract as discharged against B, he may also treat it as discharged
against [the beneficiary] .... In cases like this, A's right to treat the contract as dis-
charged because of B's breach is so clear, in most states, that the question of the power
of A and B to terminate the contract by mutual agreement is of little or no importance."
[Emphasis added.]88 See, 4 CoRmiN, CoTRAcrs § 818, at 269-72 (1951).
89 See generally 3A Coun, CoNTRAcrs § 654, at 136 (1960).
90 6 WniasToN, CoNTRmcTs § 827, at 68 (3d ed. 1957).
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survivor is under no obligation to perform since the promise he bargained for
was broken.9 ' Thus, the beneficiaries have no cause of action against the survivor
since the survivor has no duty to perform due to the "failure of consideration"
upon which his performance was dependent.92
In the Mitchell case, the wife breached the agreement to make mutual wills
before the husband died leaving a nonconforming will. The court concluded that
the wife's breach freed the husband from his obligations.93 A fine distinction
between an agreement to make wills normally made by married couples and the
one involved in the Mitchell case may have been overlooked by the court. Unlike
married couples, separating couples generally have little concern for each other.
This lack of concern is evidence by a separation agreement in which the parties
promise to will directly to the children without providing for the property of the
first dying spouse to go to the survivor.94 The absence of this survivorship clause
results in a contract with promises on both sides which wholly benefit the third
91 "A breach of such an agreement by one of the parties may, however, be treated
by the other party or parties, at their option, as releasing them from their obligations
under the agreement." 97 C.J.S. Wills § 1367, at 307 (1957). This section was quoted
in Mitchell v. Marklund, 238 Cal. App. 2d 398, 405, 47 Cal. Rptr. 756, 761 (1965).
9 2 
"In innumerable cases, however, a promise has been declared to be unenforce-
able because there has been a 'failure of the consideration.' This does not mean lack of
consideration; nor does it often mean that the promise, now unenforceable, was never a
valid contract. It does mean, on the other hand, that a performance for which the
promisor bargained has not been rendered; in many cases, though not in all, that failure
is a good legal excuse for his refusal to perform his own promise, and it may be a good
reason for compelling restitution if he has already performed." 1 CoriiN, Co 'rtAucrs
§ 133, at 572 (1951). "A party to a contract may rescind the contract... if the con-
sideration for the obligation of the rescinding party fails, in whole or in part, through
the fault of the party as to whom he rescinds." CAL. Crv. ConE § 1689. This section
enumerates the grounds for rescinding a contract, in addition to mutual consent. See
also CAL. Civ. CoDE §§ 1691 (procedural requirements for rescission), 1692 (relief
based on rescission), 1693 (effect of delay in notice or in restoration). These statutes
were amended in 1961 as an attempt to clarify some of the confusion that existed with
respect to rescission of a contract. See generally 3 CAiFoRNIA LAw REvMiox Coml'N,
REPORTs, RECONMMATnONS & Srtmms D-5 (1961). The sections mentioned above are
applicable to third party beneficiary contracts, since the rescission clause in CAL. Civ.
CoDE § 1559 (third party beneficiary rights) "means all manner of rescission provided
by law." it. J. Cardinal Co. v. Ritchie, 218 Cal. App. 2d 124, 150, 32 Cal. Rptr. 545,
561 (1963).
03 Mitchell v. Marklund, 238 Cal. App. 2d 398, 405, 47 Cal. Rptr. 756, 761 (1965).
The court's conclusion that the wife's conduct was a breach of contract seems to con-
flict with the conclusion that either party may repudiate his promise while both parties
are alive. It could be reasoned that the wife had failed to meet the requirements of a
privileged unilateral repudiation. However, the husband had time to and did change his
will, so calling the wife's conduct a breach presents an inconsistency. Query, would
the court have called the wife's repudiation a breach had the action been brought
against her?
94 The normal definition of mutual wills does not include wills made without sur-
vivorship provisions. See note 3 supra. However, the Mitchell court did not seem hesi-
tant about labeling these promises as promises to make mutual wills. The discussion in
text is applicable to such promises whether they are called promises to make mutual
wills or not.
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party beneficiary. Such a contract presents the problem of deciding whether
performance by one should be a condition to performance by the other, since
neither party gains material benefit from performance by the other.
There is support for the position that a contract comprised of promises on
both sides which wholly benefit a donee beneficiary are consideration to support
each other, but performance by one is not dependent upon performance by the
other.9 5 This position is justifiable simply because there is no reason for implying
dependency of these promises.96 Constructive conditions are implied by the
courts, beacuse of some feeling that they should exist. As said by Mr. justice
Holmes:
You always can imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it?
It is because of some belief as to the practice of the community or of a class, or
because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of
yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement, and there-
fore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions.97
In applying mutual dependency of promises, the compelling attitudes seem to
be the desire to carry out the intention of the parties and principles of fairness
and justice.98 When separating couples execute a settlement agreement providing
for the making of mutual wills and fail to express whether they intended to have
their promises mutually dependent, they leave to the court the question of
whether or not they would have inserted such a clause had the question arisen
when the agreement was made. Undoubtedly, arguments may be presented to
support either conclusion. In most contracts, there seems to exist at least a slight
implication that the parties are bargaining for the performance of the other.
Perhaps no such implication should be made with regard to certain types of
separation agreements. The circumstances in Mitchell are typical-a lasting
bitterness between the parties. Little can be said of the concern this separating
couple had toward each other's activities. Each party, when entering the agree-
ment, seemed to be bargaining for no more than a legal right in their children
to enforce a contractual obligation of the other spouse. A determination of what
the parties intended is not an easy one. Professor Williston suggests:
The truth is, if the intention of the parties is to be brought into the doctrine of
conditions which are in reality constructive, it can only be an intention which
the court assumes the parties would have had if they had considered the matter,
and had made some provision regarding it. The only justification for such an
assumption is the fairness of dependency, as compared with independency, of
promises in bilateral contracts, and this being so it is better to drop any talk
95 "'Promises for an agreed exchange' . . . means mutual promises in a bilateral
contract where the performance promised by one party is the agreed exchange for the
performance promised by the other party .... In all bilateral contracts where the only
consideration on each side consists of promises, all the promises on one side . . . and
all the promises on the other side taken collectively are promises for an agreed exchange
except . . . where the promise of each party is wholly or to a material degree for the
benefit of a donee beneficiary." BPsTA-&TMET, CoNmRAcis, § 266, at 382 (1932). See
also 4 CoRBiN, CoNRAcATs § 818, at 271-72 (1951).
96 6 WLisIoN, CoNTRAcTs § 889A, at 579 (3d ed. 1957).
9 7 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAniv. L. BEv. 457, 466 (1897).
983A Cornn, CoNrrAcrs § 654, at 140 (1960).
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about intention of the parties where they express none and rest doctrines of con-
structive dependency solely on their fairness-a quite sufficient basis.99
In the Mitchell case, fairness requires that no condition be applied. The parties
are not without the power to mutually rescind their agreement. They could have
provided for dependency but failed to do so. The agreement serves as the fulfill-
ment of a moral obligation to society and to the children to promote the well-being
of victims of a broken family. In all likelihood, the choice of a contract to make
wills was made over alternatives which would have provided for the children in
some other manner. Without reasons to imply any conditions, the contractual
obligations should stand as expressed in the contract.10 0 Situations such as this
require that abrogation of the contract be accomplished by mutual consent rather
than by spiteful reaction. If the parties are unable to mutually agree to a dis-
charge of each other's obligation, enforcement by the beneficiaries against one
party should not depend on whether the other party has performed. In the ab-
sence of circumstances justifying a contrary finding, a separation agreement to
make mutual wills which solely benefit the children should constitute a bilateral
contract with independent promises.
Conclusion
An attempt has been made to show that testamentary disposition is but one
property interest within the realm of many. Those who favor immunity against
normal contract principles of a promise to devise and bequeath must take heed
of the dual purpose served by enforcement of that promise. Such a contract
affords the promisee the benefits of his bargain and at the same time gives the
promisor the power to utilize the privilege of testamentary disposition as a bargain-
ing asset during his lifetime. Contract law plays a primary role in the workings
of our society.1 1 To avoid undue harshness which may result from compelling one
to perform a promise, the principles of equity, mutual assent, consideration, fraud,
and others have developed. In spite of these protective measures, contract law is,
and always will be, subject to adjustment. It is not until a contractual obligation
is created in an interest, such as the privilege of testamentary disposition, that the
established rules are given a second thought. The proposition that an agreement
to make mutual wills is unenforceable without estoppel, is perhaps the result of
a latent dislike for the rule, now taken for granted, that a promise may serve as
consideration for another promise. 10 2 In the case of third party beneficiaries, it
99 6 WiLLiSTON, ComrAcrs § 825, at 59-60 (3d ed. 1957).
100 "Nlo obligation of a contract is to be regarded as a condition precedent unless
made so by express terms or necessary implication." Verdier v. Verdier, 133 Cal. App.
2d 325, 334, 284 P.2d 94, 100 (1955). The case involved a property settlement agree-
ment in connection with a separation. The wife broke her promise not to disturb her
husband, so the husband contended he need not make payments in accordance with
the agreement. Held, the promises are independent. Id. at 336, 284 P.2d at 100.
101 Llewellyn, What Price ContractP-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704,
709 (1931).
102 "What logical justification is there for holding mutual promises good consider-
ation for each other? None, it is submitted." Williston, Consideration in Bilateral Con-
tracts, 27 HAv. L. Rnv. 503, 508 (1914) (quoting Pollock). "[Ilt is also true that
whatever may be the requirements of sufficient consideration, those requirements, like
all rules of law, are in a broad sense dictated by public policy." Id. at 504-05.
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